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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“I like the smell of a dunged field, and the tumult of a popular 
election.”1 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission concerns a law 
designed to lessen what some congresspersons perceived to be the 
“dunged field” smell caused by the spate of political attack 
advertisements that typically precede popular elections.2 To improve 
the electoral aroma, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (“BCRA”) of 2002,3 which broadly banned corporate-
funded political advertising in certain periods leading up to a federal 
election.4 But in plowing under the field of corporate-funded political 
advertising, Congress unearthed the stronger stench of 
unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech. 
Citizens United (“Citizens”), a nonprofit advocacy corporation 
that produces political documentaries, filed suit in December 2007 
against the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) seeking a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of certain 
 
 * 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. AUGUSTUS WILLIAM HARE & JULIUS CHARLES HARE, GUESSES AT TRUTH 198 (New 
York, MacMillian 1889). 
 2. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S10208-02, S10209 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer) (“These 
so-called issue[] ads are not regulated at all and mention candidates by name. They directly 
attack candidates without any accountability. It is brutal. . . . We have an opportunity in the 
McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . . . .”). 
 3. McCain-Feingold Campaign-Finance Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
 4. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West 2009). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/24/2009  2:26:33 PM 
332 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:331 
provisions of the BCRA.5 Citizens was preparing to distribute its 
critical biography of then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, 
Hillary: The Movie (“Hillary”), via video on-demand (“VOD”) when 
it realized that doing so would violate BCRA section 203.6 
Additionally, Citizens realized advertisements promoting Hillary 
would have to comply with the disclosure and disclaimer 
requirements of BCRA sections 201 and 311.7 
To comply with the BCRA’s provisions, Citizens would have to 
restrict VOD access to Hillary in each state for thirty days prior to the 
state’s Democratic primary8 and place a disclaimer on all promotional 
advertisements explaining that Citizens was solely responsible for the 
advertisements’ content and that no candidate had approved the 
advertisements.9 Moreover, Citizens would have to file a report with 
the FEC disclosing the names of any donors who had contributed 
more than $1,000 to fund Hillary’s production.10 Citizens filed suit in 
district court challenging the VOD-distribution ban and the disclosure 
and disclaimer requirements as unconstitutional speech restrictions.11 
The district court denied Citizens’s preliminary injunction 
request.12 Approximately six months later, the court granted summary 
judgment to the FEC13 and held that the BCRA’s prohibition of the 
VOD distribution of Hillary and requirement of disclosure and 
disclaimers were constitutional.14 
Under a special provision of the BCRA, Citizens appealed 
directly to the Supreme Court.15 On November 14, 2008, the Court 
 
 5. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n (Citizens United I), 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 
(D.D.C. 2008). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A) (West 2009) (defining cable communications that refer to 
a candidate for federal office as “electioneering communications” if they occur within 30 days of 
a primary election) and 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (prohibiting corporations from funding 
“electioneering communications”). 
 9. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441d (West 2009). 
 10. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(2). 
 11. Citizens United I, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 12. Id. at 282. 
 13. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n (Citizens United II), No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 
2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008). 
 14. See id. (granting summary judgment to the FEC based on the reasoning in Citizens 
United I, 530 F. Supp. 2d, in which the district court ruled that the BCRA provisions were 
constitutional). 
 15. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(3), 116 
Stat. 81, 113–14 (giving the Supreme Court authority to hear direct appeals in disputes arising 
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noted it had probable jurisdiction to hear the case16 and scheduled 
oral argument for March 24, 2009. 
Citizens and the FEC dispute two issues. First, can BCRA section 
203 constitutionally prohibit the VOD distribution of a feature-length 
documentary about a candidate in an approaching federal election?17 
Second, can the FEC constitutionally apply the disclaimer and 
disclosure requirements of BCRA sections 201 and 311 to such a 
documentary?18 
This commentary will address the first issue—whether it is 
constitutional to proscribe VOD distribution of a film like Hillary. 
The second issue remains an important aspect of campaign finance 
law, but it is not explored here. 
II.  FACTS 
Citizens is a nonprofit membership corporation that, in addition to 
other forms of advocacy, produces feature-length documentaries that 
comport with its political ideology.19 In 2007, Citizens produced 
Hillary, a ninety-minute biography that examines Hillary Clinton’s 
political background in a critical light.20 The film focuses on five 
aspects of Hillary’s political career: firing of certain White House staff 
during her husband’s presidency, retaliation against a woman who 
accused her husband of sexual harassment, violations of finance 
restrictions during her Senate campaign, her husband’s abuse of the 
presidential pardon power, and her record on various political issues.21 
The documentary contains interviews with famous political 
commentators such as Dick Morris, Mark Levin, and Ann Coulter.22 
None of these commentators expressly advocate for the defeat of 
Hillary Clinton in the interviews, but many express negative opinions 
about her character and ability to be an effective president.23 
 
under the BCRA). The Supreme Court’s actual jurisdiction will likely be addressed at oral 
argument. 
 16. Citizens United II, 2008 WL 2788753, prob. juris. noted, 129 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 14, 2008) 
(No. 08-205) (mem.). 
 17. Brief for Appellant at i, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 08-205 (U.S. 
filed Jan. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 5. 
 20. Id. at 6. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n (Citizens United I), 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280 
(D.D.C. 2008). 
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Hillary’s production was financed with Citizens’s general treasury 
funds.24 Citizens alleged that ninety-nine percent of the $1 million 
donated to fund Hillary came from individuals, with the remaining 
one percent coming from for-profit corporations.25 The trial record 
does not indicate what percentage of Citizens’s general funding comes 
from for-profit corporations.26 
In January 2008, Citizens released Hillary.27 It was shown in select 
theatres in several cities and sold on DVD through Citizens’s website 
and commercial retailers.28 In addition, a large VOD provider offered 
to make Hillary available through its Elections ’08 VOD feature, an 
offer Citizens pursued until learning that such distribution would be 
prohibited by BCRA section 203.29 Had Hillary been available on 
VOD, cable subscribers could have accessed it at any time.30 
Citizens considered BCRA section 203’s prohibition of Hillary’s 
VOD distribution to be an unconstitutional speech restriction but was 
unable to obtain a preliminary injunction against section 203’s 
enforcement. Not wanting to risk criminal prosecution, Citizens 
abstained from showing Hillary through VOD during the Democratic 
primary season.31 By the time the district court granted the FEC’s 
summary judgment motion six months later, Barack Obama had 
secured the Democratic nomination, so Citizens could distribute 
Hillary at will.32 Nevertheless, Citizens, likely to face the same BCRA 
restrictions on future productions, appealed the district court’s ruling 
to the Supreme Court.33 Though it had lost the battle in district court, 
 
 24. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 7. 
 25. Id. at 32–33. 
 26. Brief for the Appellee at 30, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 08-205 
(U.S. filed Feb. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Brief for the Appellee]. 
 27. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 7. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2008); Brief 
for Appellant, supra note 17, at 8-9. 
 30. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 25. 
 31. See id. at 37–38 (arguing that the BCRA required Citizens to either “risk felony 
prosecution” or “remain silent”). 
 32. After Barack Obama secured the Democratic nomination, Hillary Clinton was no 
longer a candidate in a federal election, so the BCRA would not have applied to Hillary at that 
point. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A) et seq. (West 2009) (specifying that the BCRA only 
regulates electioneering communications, which, by definition, must refer to a candidate in a 
federal election). 
 33. See Brief for the Appellee, supra note 16, at 14 n.3 (noting that Citizens’ future 
productions will likely be subject to the BCRA). 
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prevailing in the Supreme Court would win the war for future 
election periods. 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The BCRA regulates the area of speech defined as 
“electioneering communications.”34 An electioneering communication 
is “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that refers to a 
candidate for the federal office contested in a primary or general 
election and is made within thirty days before a primary election or 
sixty days before a general election.35 
More specifically, section 203 of the BCRA, which amended the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) of 1971,36 prohibits 
corporations from funding electioneering communications with 
general treasury funds.37 Congress enacted FECA to lessen the actual 
and apparent corruption of elected officials by large campaign 
contributions by imposing limits on direct contributions to a federal 
candidate’s campaign.38 
FECA’s supporters also saw risk of quid pro quo corruption39 in 
independent expenditures (i.e., expenditures made independent of, 
and not in coordination with, a campaign).40 Thus, FECA also imposed 
limits on the independent expenditures that could be made “relative 
to a clearly identified candidate.”41 
The constitutionality of FECA’s contribution and independent 
expenditure limitations was first challenged in Buckley v. Valeo.42 In 
that case, the Court held that the government had a compelling 
interest in preventing actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption in 
federal elections.43 It then held that FECA’s contribution limitations 
were constitutional because they furthered that interest without 
 
 34. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A) (West 2009). 
 35. Id. Because the theatre and DVD distributions of Hillary did not meet the definition of 
electioneering communication, the FEC could not criminalize their distribution. 
 36. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (West 2009)). 
 37. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West 2009). 
 38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976). 
 39. Quid pro quo refers to politicians inappropriately rewarding significant political 
supporters with political favors. 
 40. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (addressing Congress’s contention that independent 
expenditures pose a quid pro quo corruption threat). 
 41. Id. at 39 (discussing FECA § 608(e)(1), amended by 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West 
2009)). 
 42. Buckley, 424 U.S. 
 43. Id. at 26–27. 
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unnecessarily abridging the associational freedoms of contributors or 
otherwise limiting their speech.44 
In contrast, the Buckley Court held FECA’s independent 
expenditure restrictions unconstitutional.45 Applying strict scrutiny, 
the Court first noted that the language in FECA’s independent 
expenditure provision—”relative to a clearly identified candidate”—
was impermissibly vague.46 To make the language clear, the Court 
construed it narrowly to cover only expenditures that funded express 
advocacy (i.e., advocacy employing words that specifically advocate 
the election or defeat of a candidate, such as “vote for,” “support,” 
“defeat,” etc.).47 But even after narrowing the language, the Court 
struck down FECA’s independent expenditure provisions based on its 
reasoning that independent expenditures, unlike direct contributions, 
did not pose a threat of quid pro quo corruption.48 Thus, FECA’s 
independent expenditure limitations failed to advance the 
government’s compelling interest in avoiding actual or apparent quid 
pro quo corruption in elections.49 
Two years after Buckley, the Court confirmed that independent 
expenditures could not be constitutionally restricted, even if those 
expenditures were made by corporations rather than individuals. In 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,50 the Court held that First 
Amendment protections remain in force even if the speaker is a 
corporation.51 Further, it held that the threat of wealthy corporations 
“drown[ing] out other points of view” could not justify suppressing 
corporate speech.52 The Court held that corporate speech was no less 
valuable to the democratic process than speech from other sources, 
 
 44. Id. at 28. The Court did not subject FECA’s direct contribution limitations to a strict 
scrutiny standard because they imposed only “marginal restriction[s]” on donors’ abilities to 
engage in political speech; though limiting what a donor could give to a particular candidate, 
they otherwise left donors free to engage in unlimited, independent political advocacy. Id. at 20–
21. The court applied a lower level of scrutiny to FECA’s direct contribution limitations without 
identifying the level of scrutiny used. Id. at 25. 
 45. Id. at 41. The Court held that FECA’s independent expenditure restrictions were 
subject to strict scrutiny, because they limited the amount of expression individuals and 
organizations could engage in relative to a given candidate. Id. at 44–45. 
 46. Id. at 43–44. 
 47. Id. at 44. 
 48. Id. at 46–47. 
 49. Id. at 47–48. 
 50. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 51. Id. at 776–77. 
 52. Id. at 789. 
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stating that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech . . . does not depend 
upon the identity of its source.”53 
Ten years later, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,54 the 
Court effectively reversed the position it took in Bellotti. In Austin the 
Court permitted the regulation of independent corporate 
expenditures, without overruling Bellotti, based on a newly-identified 
form of corruption that, according to the Court, the government had a 
compelling interest in reducing.55 The Austin Court described this 
newly-identified form of corruption as “the corrosive and distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with 
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to 
the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”56 Essentially, 
the Austin Court believed that corporate resources raised through 
business operations, selling shares, and borrowing are otherwise much 
larger than if raised through donations seeking to advance a 
particular political message and that this gives an unfair political 
advantage to corporate ideas.57 The Court ruled this way despite its 
holding in Bellotti that corporate speech enjoyed the same First 
Amendment protections as individual speech.58 
Importantly, in Austin and every campaign-finance case before it, 
the Court only addressed laws that restricted independent corporate 
expenditures made for express advocacy.59 After Austin, corporations 
continued to make large independent expenditures simply by 
avoiding the “magic words” of express advocacy.60 Corporate ads 
would refer to federal candidates by name without expressly calling 
for their election or defeat.61 Most of these ads were scripted as “issue 
ads” that raised a political issue and then referred to a candidate’s 
position on that issue.62 
 
 53. Id. at 776–77. 
 54. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 55. Id. at 660. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 658–59. 
 58. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–77. 
 59. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2679 (2007) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that speech regulation from 
Buckley to Austin was limited to express advocacy). 
 60. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n (McConnell I), 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 527 (D.D.C. 
2003). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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By 2002, the number of independent corporate issue ads had risen 
substantially.63 Congress considered this problematic, and accordingly 
enacted the BCRA—with its definition of “electioneering 
communications”—to “stanch” the “flow of [corporate] money” 
funding the issue ads appearing before federal elections.64 In its 
definition of “electioneering communications,” the BCRA disposed of 
the distinctions between express advocacy ads and issue ads and 
simply prohibited any corporate-funded ads that referred to a federal 
candidate within thirty days of a primary election or sixty days of a 
general election.65 
Immediately after the BCRA was enacted it was challenged. In 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,66 multiple plaintiffs 
asserted that section 203 was an unconstitutional speech restriction 
because the “electioneering communications” that section 203 
prohibited extended beyond express advocacy.67 But the Court upheld 
section 203 as facially constitutional, reasoning that the justifications 
for regulating independent corporate expenditures constituting 
express advocacy “apply equally” to ads that are “the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.”68 The Court believed that the 
regulation of such expenditures was acceptable because they could 
have the kind of “corrosive and distorting effect” on the electorate 
recognized in Austin and because the government had a compelling 
interest in countering those effects.69 
Though the Supreme Court did not elaborate on the point, the 
district court in McConnell had found that the BCRA targeted only 
broadcast ads because those ads are the most effective form of 
communicating an electioneering message and therefore posed the 
greatest risk of corruption.70 The district court noted that forms of 
 
 63. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2694–95 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 64. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n (McConnell II), 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003). 
 65. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A). Also, the BCRA applies to nearly all corporations, including 
non-profit advocacy corporations that receive any portion of their funding from for-profit 
corporations. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (exempting only ideological, nonprofit, membership 
corporations that do not accept funding from for-profit corporations from the BCRA). 
Congress apparently designed the BCRA in this way to ensure that for-profit corporations 
could not avoid the law by simply funneling money through a nonprofit advocacy corporation. 
 66. McConnell II, 540 U.S. 
 67. Id. at 205–06. 
 68. Id. at 206 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at 205. 
 70. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n (McConnell I), 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 569–71 
(D.D.C. 2003). 
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media that required viewers to “opt-in” or “make a choice to . . . 
watch the program”71 would mostly reach voters already predisposed 
to those views and would reach far fewer undecided voters than a 
broadcast ad.72 For the McConnell district court, this was a “critical 
distinction” that separated communications that posed a great risk of 
corruption (broadcast ads) from those that did not (viewer choice 
media).73 
Though finding section 203 facially constitutional, the Supreme 
Court noted that future as-applied challenges to section 203 may 
nonetheless succeed.74 The first as-applied challenge came four years 
later in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
(“WRTL”).75 In WRTL, the Court fragmented into three lines of 
reasoning. Each of the three fragments must be considered because 
each is important to an analysis and prediction of what may happen in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. 
A. Fragment 1 
The lead opinion in WRTL was authored by Chief Justice Roberts 
and joined by Justice Alito. Justice Roberts accepted McConnell’s 
holding that section 203 could constitutionally prohibit ads that were 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.76 In addition, Justice 
Roberts held that “a court should find that an ad is the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or 
against a specific candidate.”77 Justice Roberts reasoned that this must 
be an objective test that focuses on the ad’s substance and not on 
contextual factors that might illustrate the corporation’s reasons for 
running the ad.78 Applying this test, Justice Roberts reasoned that 
Wisconsin Right to Life’s ads were not the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy because they took a position on a legislative issue 
 
 71. Id. at 571. 
 72. Id. at 646; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 24–25. 
 73. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 24–25. 
 74. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 546 U.S. 410, 411–12 (2006). The 
Supreme Court confirmed in this case that in holding section 203 facially constitutional 
McConnell still permitted future as-applied challenges to section 203. 
 75. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 76. Id. at 2664 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
 77. Id. at 2667. 
 78. Id. at 2666. 
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and urged the public to contact their representatives about it.79 
Moreover, they neither “mention[ed] an election, candidacy, political 
party, or challenger” nor “[took] a position on a candidate’s character, 
qualifications, or fitness for office.”80 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy disagreed with Justice 
Roberts’s functional equivalency test but concurred in the judgment 
that section 203 was unconstitutional as applied to Wisconsin Right to 
Life’s ads. This gave authoritative weight to Justice Roberts’s test 
based on the principle that “when a fragmented Court decides a case 
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.”81 After WRTL, the FEC promulgated federal regulations 
that implemented Justice Roberts’s formulation.82 
There is one other important aspect of Justice Roberts’s opinion. 
WRTL had argued that even if the for-profit, corporate-funded 
advertisements in Austin threatened to corrupt the electoral process 
because the advertisements might not reflect the actual views of 
shareholders, nonprofit advocacy-group-funded advertisements did 
not pose such a threat because those advertisements wholly-reflect 
the views of the nonprofit’s members.83 Justice Roberts declined to 
address this argument because Wisconsin Right to Life had received 
some of its funding from for-profit corporations.84 
B. Fragment 2 
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices 
Thomas and Kennedy. Justice Scalia argued that McConnell was 
incorrect insofar as it had held that section 203 could constitutionally 
prohibit the functional equivalent of express advocacy.85 He believed 
that any test to determine what constitutes the functional equivalent 
of express advocacy would be too vague in application to justify 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 2667. 
 81. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278 n.10 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). Citizens United and the FEC agreed 
in district court that Justice Roberts’s formulation was the “governing test for the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.” Id. 
 82. 11 C.F.R. § 114.15 (2007). 
 83. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 n.10 (2007). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 2684 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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McConnell’s holding that section 203 is facially constitutional, but that 
section 203 could be challenged, without vagueness concerns, on an 
as-applied basis.86 He argued the necessary uncertainty of any 
functional equivalency test would fail to distinguish between issue ads 
and campaign ads disguised as issue ads, thereby improperly 
restricting many genuine issue ads.87 Justice Scalia believed the 
express advocacy test of Buckley should define the limits of section 
203 because it is the only test that provides certainty without 
unconstitutionally chilling political speech, even if it allows many 
advocacy ads disguised as issue ads to be broadcast.88 
Justice Scalia also believed that Austin was an indefensible 
departure from Buckley and Bellotti and that it should be overruled.89 
He would return the law to the point where speech bans were not 
permitted in the independent expenditure arena at all, even if they 
are corporate expenditures paying for express advocacy ads.90 
C. Fragment 3 
Justice Souter dissented and was joined by Justices Ginsberg, 
Stevens, and Breyer. Justice Souter agreed that section 203 could 
prohibit issue ads that are the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy but disagreed with Justice Roberts about the proper test for 
functional equivalency.91 Justice Souter argued that the test should be 
the converse of Justice Roberts’s test: anything that could conceivably 
be construed as a call to vote for or against a candidate should be 
deemed the functional equivalent of express advocacy.92 He believed 
that Justice Roberts’s test effectively overruled McConnell by 
returning the law to a state that proscribes only express advocacy ads, 
because most ads without the “magic words” could be reasonably 
construed as something other than the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.93 
The Court did not consider the application of section 203 to a 
feature-length political documentary such as Hillary, nor has it done 
 
 86. Id. at 2683–84. 
 87. Id. at 2684. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 2679. 
 90. Id. at 2686. 
 91. Id. at 2698 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 2699. 
 93. Id. 
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so in any case to date. The broadcast advertising considered by the 
Court in WRTL and other cases has been traditional ten-second to 
thirty-second ads run during regular programming. 
IV. HOLDING 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the district 
court first held that the VOD distribution of Hillary qualified as an 
electioneering communication under the BCRA because it would be 
communicated via a cable system within thirty days of several 
Democratic presidential primaries and plainly referred to then-
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.94 Next, the district court 
recognized that BCRA section 203 prohibited corporations from 
funding electioneering communications out of their general treasury 
funds.95 Because Hillary was so funded, section 203 prohibited its 
VOD distribution during the thirty-day period before any Democratic 
primary.96 
Turning to the constitutionality of section 203, the district court 
recognized that the McConnell decision upheld section 203 as facially 
constitutional insofar as it prohibited ads that constituted express 
advocacy or the functional equivalent thereof, something to be 
decided on an as-applied basis.97 The district court, however, did not 
consider Hillary to be express advocacy.98 As a result, whether 
Citizens’s as-applied challenge would prevail depended on whether 
Hillary was the functional equivalent of express advocacy.99 The 
parties agreed that the “governing law” for the functional equivalent 
of express advocacy was Justice Roberts’s test in WRTL.100 
Applying Justice Roberts’s WRTL test, the district court ruled 
that Hillary was the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
because it could not be interpreted as anything other than an appeal 
to defeat Hillary Clinton.101 In making this conclusion, the district 
 
 94. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n (Citizens United I), 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 
n.6 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 95. Id. at 277. 
 96. Id. at 280. 
 97. Id. at 278. 
 98. See id. at 278–80 (the district court’s analysis focused solely on whether Hillary was the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy, which would have been unnecessary had the court 
considered Hillary express advocacy). 
 99. Id. at 278–79. 
 100. Id. at 277 n.6. 
 101. Id. at 279–80. 
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court observed that Hillary focuses very little on current legislative 
issues; makes repeated references to the presidential election and 
Hillary Clinton’s candidacy; and takes a position on her character, 
qualifications, and fitness for the office of president.102 The district 
court cited many of the film’s negative comments about Hillary 
Clinton to demonstrate that, on the whole, the film is an appeal to 
defeat her.103 Accordingly, the district court ruled that Hillary could be 
constitutionally prohibited by BCRA section 203.104 
V.  ANALYSIS 
“The first instinct of power is the retention of power, and, under a 
Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved 
by the suppression of election-time speech.”105 
The text of the First Amendment is worth remembering, even 
though it has played a minor role in the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
the cases that have influenced the interpretation of BCRA section 
203:“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”106 Even if one concedes that the Supreme Court cannot 
always interpret the First Amendment in an absolute sense, any 
speech restrictions the Court upholds must be supported by a 
compelling interest.107 A statutory ban on ads that criticize incumbent 
or would-be elected officials hardly seems compelling. In fact, the 
founders likely had a mind to prevent such laws when they inscribed 
the words “no law” on parchment in the Bill of Rights.108 The district 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 280 n.12. For example, here are two of approximately twelve quotes cited by the 
district court: (1) “She is steeped in controversy, steeped in sleaze, that's why they don't want us 
to look at her record.” (2) “I mean think of what it says about Hillary Clinton that she was 
willing to put up with his open philandering, with anything in a skirt who wanders before his 
eyesight all for the power—at least with Bill Clinton he was just good time Charlie. Hillary’s got 
an agenda and she’s willing to put up with that to be [P]resident of the [U]nited [S]tates, she's 
got a to do list when she gets to the White House.” 
 104. Id. 
 105. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 107. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (“[T]he [judicial] 
presumption of constitutionality [is narrow] when legislation appears on its face to be within a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first Ten Amendments . . . .”). 
 108. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800 28 (Richmond, J.W. 
Randolph 1850) (“The right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free 
communication among the people thereon . . . has ever been justly deemed the only effectual 
guardian of every other right.”); JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 456 (Boston, 
Little, Brown, and Co. 1865) (“[L]iberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge 
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court, however, was not at liberty to consider such first principles 
because precedent had long papered over the First Amendment’s 
foundational text. 
According to the district court, precedent required consideration 
of a single issue to determine the constitutionality of section 203 as 
applied to Hillary: whether the film is the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy under Justice Roberts’s Federal Election 
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. test.109 The district court 
held that it was because the film clearly mentions Hillary’s 
presidential candidacy, takes a position on her character and 
qualifications to be president, and does not focus primarily on 
legislative issues.110 
Though the district court was correct about much of Hillary’s 
content, it may have been incorrect that Hillary was the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy because Justice Roberts’s WRTL 
factors were used to analyze thirty-second advertisements, not 
feature-length films. A thirty-second advertisement that mentioned 
Clinton’s presidential candidacy and then attacked her presidential 
character and qualifications would leave little time for much else. 
Such an ad could only be interpreted as an appeal not to vote for 
Hillary Clinton. But Hillary is a ninety-minute film that, in addition to 
the content recognized by the district court, also contains a great deal 
of biographical information about Clinton’s political career and 
discusses the positions she takes on current political issues.111 The film 
could be interpreted as something other than the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy. For example, it could be viewed as a 
critical biography of a prominent politician or as an entertainment 
piece for political aficionados.112 
Under Justice Roberts’s test, Citizens’s desire to broadcast the 
film during an election cycle is irrelevant because this desire is a 
contextual factor that focuses on Citizens’s intent in producing the 
film.113 
 
among the people, who have a right . . . and a desire to know; but besides this, they have a right, 
an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of 
knowledge, I mean, of the characters and conduct of their rulers.”). 
 109. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 278–79. 
 110. Id. at 12. 
 111. Id. at 40. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2007). 
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This case might illustrate that Justice Scalia was right to believe 
that any test for the functional equivalent of express advocacy would 
often be too difficult to apply in practice.114 Conversely, this case might 
illustrate that Justice Souter was correct to believe that very few non-
express advocacy communications will be prohibited by section 203 
because most applications of Justice Roberts’s test will find other 
reasonable interpretations of a given communication.115 But the case 
is most likely to demonstrate that while short, political advertisements 
should be deemed the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
when the factors of Justice Roberts’s WRTL test are present, similar 
functional equivalency concerns are not necessarily present with 
feature-length films. Feature-length films that contain the WRTL 
factors have plenty of room for other substantive material that could 
lead a reasonable viewer to interpret the film as something other than 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy. 
The WRTL functional equivalency test ultimately assesses 
whether a given communication poses a risk of corruption to the 
election process so great that Congress is compelled to regulate it.116 
Accordingly, when applying the WRTL test to Hillary, the district 
court should have considered whether Hillary posed any risk of 
corruption to federal elections.  
The fact that accessing Hillary required viewer choice is vital to 
this inquiry.117 Viewers had to affirmatively elect to watch Hillary by 
ordering it on a VOD service.118 Even if the government has a 
compelling interest in regulating short campaign ads thrust upon the 
masses during prime-time programming, it does not follow that the 
government has an interest in prohibiting people from voluntarily 
deciding to invest ninety minutes to see what a political advocacy 
group has to say about a candidate.119 The threat of amassed corporate 
wealth distorting the views of the electorate is not as great when the 
segment of the electorate that views the communication is self-
selecting. 
 
 114. Id. at 2683–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 115. Id. at 2699 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 2672. 
 117. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 569–71 (D.D.C. 2003); Brief 
for Appellant, supra note 17, at 25–26. 
 118. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 25–26. 
 119. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
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Admittedly, the BCRA does not distinguish between full-length 
feature films and thirty-second ads in its definition of “electioneering 
communications.” Nor does it recognize an exception to 
“electioneering communications” based on viewer choice. But neither 
lack of distinction nor lack of an exception in the statute should 
matter because every application of a statute that restricts speech 
must further a compelling interest.120 The government does not have a 
compelling interest in suppressing a film like Hillary. And even if it 
did, the BCRA is underinclusive because it only prohibits the VOD 
distribution of Hillary and does not prohibit the internet download of 
Hillary or the selling of Hillary DVDs.121 How this selective restriction 
of speech furthers a government interest is unclear. 
Citizens makes two additional arguments on appeal that the Court 
will likely address. First, Citizens argues that the reasoning in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce does not apply because the funding 
for Hillary came predominantly from individual donors and therefore 
reflects the level of popular support for the views expressed in 
Hillary.122 This argument will likely be dismissed by the Court, as it 
was in WRTL, because there are insufficient facts on the record to 
know what percentage of general funding came from for-profit 
corporations.123 
Citizens also argues that Austin is inconsistent with Buckley v. 
Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and should be 
overruled.124 This argument is unlikely to be successful because only 
three of the justices agree.125 In addition, overruling Austin would 
invalidate McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and much of the 
BCRA because it would prohibit Congress from regulating 
independent corporate expenditures altogether.126 Though this 
outcome would be more in harmony with the First Amendment’s “no 
law” injunction than existing precedent, there simply are not enough 
votes on the Court to overrule Austin. 
 
 120. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2671. 
 121. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 27–28. 
 122. Id. at 29–30. 
 123. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 26, at 30. 
 124. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 30–31. 
 125. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Austin . . . was wrongly decided.”). Justice Scalia was joined in this opinion by Justices 
Kennedy and Thomas. 
 126. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 26, at 34–35. 
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VI.  DISPOSITION/CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will likely apply the 
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. to 
feature-length films, but make it clear that feature-length films 
containing the WRTL factors (mentioning an election, taking a 
position on a candidate’s character, etc.) may nevertheless be 
interpreted as something other than the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy depending on the film’s substantive content. They 
may even develop additional factors to consider when applying the 
WRTL test to feature-length films. The Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce concern that corporate wealth could corrupt the 
electoral process will be tantamount to their analysis. They will likely 
hold that where there is a self-selecting audience, corruption of the 
electoral process is less of a risk and therefore the government would 
not further a compelling interest by banning the film. 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy will probably concur in the 
judgment but continue to maintain that McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission and Austin should be overruled, which would free all 
independent corporate expenditures from speech restrictions and 
make the VOD broadcast of Hillary prima facia acceptable. 
If a 5-4 majority results, Justices Roberts and Alito will be the 
authors of the leading opinion and their judgment will be the law for 
applying BCRA section 203 to films like Hillary. It is hard to predict 
how Justices Souter, Ginsberg, Stevens, and Breyer will vote. They are 
generally favorable to the restrictions imposed by BCRA section 
203,127 but they may be persuaded that the element of viewer choice 
changes the calculus by eliminating or reducing the interest the 
government has in restricting such speech.  
In any event, Citizens will likely prevail in the Supreme Court, 
freeing it and similar groups—on both sides of the political 
spectrum—to produce and distribute films like Hillary to self-
selecting audiences during future pre-election periods. This would be 
a desirable result because there are plenty of biographical targets in 
Washington whose political merit and professional credentials, or lack 
thereof, should not be shielded by campaign finance laws that 
derogate the First Amendment. 
 
 127. All four justices voted to uphold section 203 in WRTL. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 
S. Ct. at 2687 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
